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Abstract
The poaching of rhinos has increased dramatically in recent years, creating an ongoing problem
and cost to rhino managers. A manager may decrease the reward to the poacher by devaluing
the horn such as dehorning so that only a stub is left, or inserting a poison, dye or GPS tracker.
However, as it is impossible to remove all value of the horn (a stub remains, poison fades,
or GPS trackers can be removed) a poacher may still kill the rhino for the partial gain from
the horn, and to avoid tracking this particular rhino in the future. We consider the problem
as a theoretical game, where the players are poachers and a rhino manager. By considering
the payoff to both manger and poachers we highlight the manager’s struggle to discourage
poachers to not kill a devalued rhino, despite the loss of time, and increase of risk, to the
poacher. Generally, the manager can only influence the situation if virtually all rhino horns are
devalued, or the risk involved to the poacher is increased, such as through greater enforcement.
However, the cost to devalue the last few rhinos may be very costly due to the sparsity of rhinos,
and the rhino manager can easily make a loss by trying to devalue the last, few rhinos. But,
whilst a few rhinos remain with their intact horn, a poacher is unlikely to avoid a particular
ranch.




The illegal trade in rhino horn supports aggressive poaching syndicates and a black market2
(Nowell et al. 1992). This lucrative market entices people to invest their time and energy to gain3
a ‘winfall’ in the form of a rhino horn, through the poaching of rhinos. In recent years poaching4
has escalated to an unpresidented level resulting in concerns over their future existence (Smith5
et al. 2013). In response, rhino conservation has seen increased militarisation with ‘boots on6
the ground’ and ‘eyes in the sky’ (Duffy et al. 2015). An alternative method is to devalue7
the horn itself, one of the main methods being the removal so that only a stub is left. The8
first attempt at large-scale rhino dehorning as an anti-poaching measure was in Damordond,9
Namibia, in 1989 (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams 1992). Other methods of devaluing the10
horn that have been suggested include the insertion of poisons, dyes or GPS trackers (Gill 2010,11
Smith 2013). However, like dehorning, they cannot remove all the potential gain from an intact12
horn (poison and dyes fade or GPS trackers can be removed). This paper considers the general13
strategy of devaluing horns, which includes dehorning.14
Rhino populations now persist largely in protected areas or on private land, and require15
intensive protection (Ferreira et al. 2014). For wildlife manages law enforcement is often one16
of the main methods of detering poaching, however rhino managers can remove the poaching17
incentive by devaluing their rhinos (Milner-Gulland 1999).18
A manager does not need to choose law enforcement or devaluing, but perhaps adopt a19
combination of the two; especially given that devaluing rhinos comes at a cost to the manager,20
and the process comes with a risk to the rhinos. Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992)21
found the optimum proportion to dehorn using mean horn length as a measure of the proportion22
of rhinos dehorned. They showed, with realistic parameter values, that the optimal strategy is23
to dehorn as many rhinos as possible. Further, Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992)24
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discussed dehorning as a better strategy than anti-poaching protection since the benefits are25
carried over to subsequent years where the rhino horn length is shorter, whereas anti-poaching26
protection costs are renewed each year.27
We consider one year only, for a single rhino manager. We assume a given amount of re-28
source available for the year, and that all rhinos initially have intact horns. Rhino managers29
may devalue a proportion of their rhinos. We assume that managers would like to devalue as30
few as possible, whilst still ensuring the safety of their rhinos. This is a problem of conflicting31
interests, game theory can provide an appropriate framework. A game theoretic perspective32
provides insights about (a) the strategies different stakeholders will likely adopt given their33
objectives when consensus, compromise, or cooperation are feasible, (b) what types of coop-34
eration best reflect stakeholders interests and achieve their objectives (c) which stakeholders35
are likely to form coalitions, (d) the range of possible outcomes under non-cooperative and36
cooperative decision-making dynamics, and (e) whether an optimal or satisfactory solution for37
all stakeholders can be reached simultaneously (Colyvan et al. 2011).38
The model we present is similar to the cyclic model used by Bell (1986), where the stake-39
holders were insects and flowers. Insects and flowers each behaved in one of two ways de-40
termined by particular rules, and a cycle of behaviour was formed. With rhino managers and41
poachers the rules engender a different, non-cyclic, pattern of behaviour where the system set-42
tles to one of two states.43
Poachers may either only kill rhinos with full horns, ‘selective poachers’, or kill all rhi-44
nos they encounter, ‘random poachers’. If all rhinos are left by the rhino manager with their45
intact horns, it does not pay poachers to be selective so they will become random poachers.46
Conversely, if all poachers are selective, it pays rhino managers to invest in devaluing his/her47
rhinos. This dynamic is represented in Fig. 1.48
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Assuming poachers and managers will always behave so as to maximise their payoff, there49
are two equilibriums: either all devalued and all poachers selective; or all horns intact and all50
poachers random. Essentially, either the managers win, the top left quadrant of Fig. 1, or the51
poachers win, the bottom right quadrant of Fig. 1.52
2. The model53
Consider the situation on one ranch. Let r be the proportion of devalued rhinos (where here,54
rhino value is only measured by its horn value), and s be the proportion of selective poachers.55
Assuming a poacher encounters a rhino, there are four scenarios which depend on the strategy56
of the players. The probabilities of each of these four scenarios are given in Table 1. The actual
Horn devalued Horn intact
Selective rs (1 − r)s
Random r(1 − s) (1 − r)(1 − s)
Table 1: The probabilities of each of the four scenarios given that a poacher has encountered a
rhino.
57
probabilities in Table 1 are unknown to the players. They must choose which strategy to take58
with imperfect information, which is especially relevant to the poachers who can choose their59
strategy instantaneously, unlike the manager. Furthermore, at any time, the manager can only60
only choose to either not devalue any further rhinos, or to increase the proportion which are61
devalued.62
2.1. The rhino manager63
The rhino manager initially has C resources, which is the cost to devalue the horns from all64
of his/her rhinos. Then the cost to devalue a proportion of the rhinos is Cr1/α, α > 0. When65
α = 1 the cost to devalue the first rhino is the same as devaluing the last rhino, the relationship is66
linear. This would represent a high density of rhinos where there is no time penalty incurred to67
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find each rhino. However if the cost to devalue the last few rhinos is more costly because of the68
time needed to find the last remaining intact rhinos (Milner-Gulland 1999), then 0 < α ≤ 1, see69
Fig. 2. As α→ 0 the marginal cost to devalue the last few rhinos tends to infinity, representing70
the difficulty of tracking very sparse rhinos. Note that if devaluing the first rhino is the most71
expensive, perhaps due to start-up costs, then α > 1, however in reality this is unlikely to be72
the case so we consider 0 < α ≤ 1 only.73
Let K be the cost to the rhino manager from rhino killings. Then the expected payoff for a74
manager under each scenario is given in Table 2, where the payoff is in terms of reducing the75
loss to C. Therefore, the expected payoff to the manager is the sum of all four expected payoffs76
in Table 2,77
Em = r(sK −Cr
1/α). (1)
Notice that when r1/α < sK/C the expected payoff is positive, which signifies the savings from78
unused resources C.79
The expected payoff to the manager is linear in s, meaning that for any given proportion80
of devalued rhinos r, the relationship between the proportion of selective poachers s and the81
expected payoff to the manager is linear. Therefore for any given r, if there is a maximum82
expected payoff to the manager, it is at s = 1 (all rhino horns are devalued).83
Conversely for a varying proportion of selecting poachers s, the expected payoff to the84







calculated by setting ∂Em/∂r = 0. Equation (2) often has a maximum larger than 1, meaning86
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Horn devalued Horn intact
Selective −Cr(α+1)/αs −K(1 − r)s
Random −(K +Cr1/α)r(1 − s) −K(1 − r)(1 − s)
Table 2: Expected payoff to the rhino manager under each scenario.
that the manager can only minimise his or her loss by devaluing all the rhino horns, r = 1.87
For the optimum proportion of rhinos to devalue to be less than one, the manager requires88
C/(αK) < s. Therefore when all the poachers are random s = 0, there is not an optimum r89
less than one; and when all the poachers are selective s = 1, there is an optimum less than one90
provided the cost of a killed rhino is large enough such that K > C/α. However, in reality a91
manager could not choose what proportion to devalue based on (2) as the proportion of selectors92
s at any given time is unknown.93
2.2. The rhino poacher94
The rhino poacher initially has no resources. Essentially the expected payoff to the poacher95
is the amount gained from an intact horn, or a devalued horn, less the time and risk to find and96
kill a rhino, and this is all relative to the salary and lifestyle of the individual poacher. Let H97
be the gain to the poacher from an intact and γH, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, be the gain from a devalued horn.98
We consider the time to kill a rhino T , the time to find a rhino F and, for the selecting99
poachers, a discerning time D to establish whether the rhino has an intact or devalued horn.100
The time dependent variables, represent time together with the associated risk per unit of time,101
so a manager can increase T , D and F by additional policing. The time taken to find a rhino is102
linked to the density of the rhinos α, so we set F = f + 1/α, where f is the time taken to find a103
rhino if the rhinos are very dense. As α → 0 the time taken to find a rhino F tends to infinity,104
representing the difficulty of tracking very sparse rhinos. The expected payoff to the poacher105
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Hor devalued Horn intact
Selective −(F + D)rs (H − F − D − T )(1 − r)s
Random (γH − F − T )r(1 − s) (H − F − T )(1 − r)(1 − s)
Table 3: Expected payoff to the poacher under each scenario.
Ep is the sum of all four expected payoffs in Table 3,106
Ep = (T − γH) rs − (H − γH) r − Ds + H − F − T. (3)
An individual poacher can choose his or her behaviour instantaneously, flipping from ran-107
dom s = 0 to selective s = 1 according to the average state of the rhinos on the particular108
ranch.109
Consider the situation where only one poacher visits the ranch and behaves randomly s = 0110
then, from (3), the manager needs to devalue111
r ≥
H − F − T
H − γH
, (4)
to ensure the poacher does not make a profit. Assuming H > F + T , the right-hand side of112
equation (4) is greater than one if F + T < γH. That is, if the time and associated risk to find113
and kill a rhino is less than the gain from a devalued horn, the random poacher cannot make114
a loss irrespective of the portion of horns devalued, thus the manager has ‘lost the game’ (the115
bottom right quadrant of Fig. 1).116
Alternatively, if the poacher behaves selectively s = 1 then, from (3), the manager needs to117
devalue118
r ≥
H − T − D − F
H − T
where H > T, (5)
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to ensure the poacher does not make a profit. Equation (5) is always less than one. That is, if119
the poacher is selective, there is always a proportion of rhinos a manager can devalue to ensure120
the poacher would not make a profit on his or her particular ranch, thus the manager has ‘won121
the game’ (the top left quadrant of Fig. 1).122
The model does not change in time. That is, should the variables for either players change,123
the expected payoffs need to be recalculated.124
3. Examples125
3.1. The rhino manager126
We consider some examples and examine the expected payoff for the rhino manager in127
Fig. 3. In all cases, if all poachers behave randomly s = 0, there is no gain to be made by128
devaluing rhino horns, and devaluing only means a further loss of resources are incurred. In129
fact, for all s, the optimum proportion to devalue is always less than 1. That is, after r defined130
by equation (2), the extra cost to devalue becomes a waste of resources, and would be better131
spent on other measures. Nonetheless, as the proportion of selectors increase s → 1, the greater132
the proportion of rhinos that need to be devalued to minimise loss to resources.133
In the case of fairly sparse rhinos, say α = 0.125 (Fig. 3d), a larger proportion of selectors134
are required before it is deemed worthwhile to devalue. However, once devaluing has been135
deemed a cost saving expense, a significant portion of rhinos need to be devalued. Generally,136
as α→ 0, the optimum proportion to devalue increases.137
In the case where the cost of devaluing all rhino horns (the total resource) is equal to the138
cost of one killed rhino C = K (Fig. 3a), the manager can ensure that no loss is incurred for all139
proportions of selecting poachers by devaluing at most sα rhinos (from equation (2)).140
The manager can conserve the most resources when C < K (Fig. 3b), despite the optimum141
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proportion to devalue being close to 1. As C << K, this optimum proportion increases.142
When C > K (Fig. 3c), the manager suffers the biggest loss of resources and devaluing143
would be an inadvisable strategy. Even when all poachers are selective, it is not beneficial to144
devalue a significant portion, and this portion decreases as C >> K.145
3.2. The rhino poacher146
We consider some examples and examine the expected payoff for the rhino poacher in147
Fig. 4. In all cases, if all poachers behave selectively s = 1, the manager can choose an148
optimum number of rhinos to devalue (see equation (5)), albeit this proportion is generally149
high.150
If all poachers behave selectively s = 1, the proportion of rhinos to devalue depends upon151
the relationship between the finding and killing time (and associated risk), F + T , and the gain152
from a devalued horn γH (see equation (4)). When F +T = γH, the only deterrent is devaluing153
all rhinos (Fig. 4a). Should the gain from a devalued horn drop, the necessary proportion of154
rhinos to devalue drops (Fig. 4b). Conversely, should the gain of a devalued horn increase so155
that F + T < γH, there is not an optimum proportion to devalue since a damaged horn would156
still prove profitable for the poacher (Fig. 4c). Although the manager has little control over the157
gain from a devalued horn for a given poacher, he or she can increase the risk involved with158
finding and killing the rhino, F + T , via security measures. This can decease the proportion159
needed to devalue (Fig. 4d).160
4. Discussion161
We have developed a model based on game theory where the two players are poachers and162
a rhino manager. There are two equilibrium states, either the manager devalues all the rhino163
horns and the poachers behave selectively, that is they do not kill these devalued rhinos so the164
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manager wins, or the manager does not devalue any horns and the poachers behave randomly,165
that is the poacher wins.166
There are clear tipping points which influence which equilibrium the model tends towards,167
based on the assumption that poachers can select their behaviour instantaneously. However, for168
these tipping points to work in the favour of the manager, the time and involved risk to find and169
kill a rhino need to be considerably more than the gain from a devalued horn. Furthermore, if170
the cost of a killed rhino is less than the cost to devaluing all the rhino horns, devaluing rhinos171
proves to be a waste of resources.172
The examples demonstrate that generally a large portion of rhinos need to be devalued to173
cause poachers to switch to selective behaviour to avoid loss. However, devaluing a large por-174
tion of rhinos is not optimal for the rhino manager. Devaluing all rhinos means that rhino175
manager has exhausted all of his/her resources. Nonetheless, when devaluing the horn by de-176
horning, investing in dehorning rhinos one year means that the benefit will last for the following177
years whilst the horn is still below full length. In subsequent years, the value of the partial horn178
increases, but no further expenditure is required by the manager.179
The values presented in the examples are perhaps unrealistic. In reality, the value of a rhino180
horn is so great - greater per unit weight than gold, diamonds or cocaine (Biggs et al. 2013) -181
that the risk and time penalties for the poacher have little influence on the final payoff. Even if182
rhino horn were to decrease in value enough to make our model realistic, we have shown that183
devaluing rhinos is a difficult game for the rhino manager to win. This is in line with current184
findings (Lindsay & Taylor 2011). We showed that even in a best case scenario, say Fig. 4d,185
where the value of a devalued horn is less than the time and associated risk to find and kill a186
rhino, a rational poacher would still behave randomly to maximise his or her payoff, making187
devaluing a waste of a manager’s resources.188
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Thus, the conservation of rhinos requires a different approach, which is likely to involve189
radical innovation. One controversial option that has been used and is still proposed is a ‘shoot190
to kill’ policy (Duffy et al. 2015, Messer 2010), however while being potentially effective it191
raises ethical concerns. Furthermore, it is ultimately still playing the theoretical game proposed192
here, where the risk associated with time is increased. This raises a dependency that the model193
has not explicitly incorporated: as the risk increases, or the quantity of horn decreases, the194
value of the horn would increase, making the game virtually impossible for a manager to win.195
To conclude, the game proposed here is challenging for the rhino manager to win unless196
rhino horn lost nearly all its value. Therefore, anti-poaching measures should not seek to tilt197
the game in the manager’s favour, but instead change the game, for example, legalising trade,198
or campaigns aimed at changing behaviour, although the latter may take some time to impact199
on rhino populations (‘t Sas-Rolfe 2016).200
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Figure 1: The dynamic between rhino managers and poachers. The arrows indicate the di-
rection that either the manager (black) or poacher (grey) would move to minimise loss. For


















Figure 2: The cost to devalue the proportion r of the rhinos for varying α. The cost to devalue
all rhinos (r = 1) is C.
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(a) K = 0.5, C = 0.5 and α = 0.5.
(b) K = 1, C = 0.5 and α = 0.5.
(c) K = 0.5, C = 1 and α = 0.5.
(d) K = 0.5, C = 0.5 and α = 0.125.
Figure 3: The expected gain to a rhino manager for various parameter values. On the contour
plot, to the right of the white dashed line indicates the manager’s savings from not devaluing all
the rhinos, to the left indicates loss to the manager, hence negative values. Specific scenarios
for varying s are highlighted by the plot presented alongside the contour plot.
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(a) H = 100, γ = 0.2, T = 7, f = 11, D = 1, and α = 0.5 (F + T = γH).
(b) H = 100, γ = 0.1, T = 2, f = 10, D = 1, and α = 0.5 (F + T > γH).
(c) H = 100, γ = 0.5, T = 2, f = 10, D = 1, and α = 0.5 (F + T < γH).
(d) H = 100, γ = 0.1, T = 4, f = 20, D = 2, and α = 0.5 (F + T > γH).
Figure 4: The expected gain to a rhino poacher for various parameter values. The right of the
white dashed line indicates the poacher making a loss. Specific scenarios for varying s are
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